The United States and the Soviet Union could drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals below the levels prescribed by the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The end of the Cold War and the transformation of international security now under way present the United States with opportunities to develop new policies based on greater international cooperation with the Soviet Union and other major powers.
This new book describes two lower levels of nuclear forces that could be achieved, as well as other related measures to improve international security.
- The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship
- Copyright
- Contents
- Foreword
- Executive Summary
- I Introduction: the Changing Political/Military Environment for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
- THE EMERGING SECURITY POLICY
- EUROPE
- EAST ASIA
- OTHER STRATEGIC AREAS
- NOTES
- II New Objectives for Nuclear Weapons Policy
- INTRODUCTION
- U.S. DETERRENCE POLICIES
- NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS
- III Prospects for Cooperative Security Arrangements and Nuclear Nonproliferation
- EUROPE
- ASIA
- NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
- NOTE
- IV Nuclear Forces
- INTRODUCTION
- CENTRAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
- Numbers of Targets and Weapons
- A Next Step After START
- A Lower Level for Later
- Sample Survivable Force Structures
- NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE
- NUCLEAR WEAPONS ELSEWHERE
- REDUCTIONS IN THE STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING
- NOTES
- V Controlling Strategic Force Operations
- INTRODUCTION
- COMMAND SYSTEM PROTECTION
- PERMISSIVE ACTION LINKS (PALS)
- COOPERATIVE WARNING
- RESILIENT SECOND STRIKE TARGETING
- NOTES
- VI Summary of Conclusions
- THE CURRENT SECURITY CONTEXT
- THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY CONTEXT
- GENERAL PRINCIPLES AFFECTING THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES
- SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS ON STRATEGIC FORCE CONFIGURATIONS
- SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS ON NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
- Appendix A Current U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces and the START Limits
- EXPLANATION OF THE FIGURE
- Appendix B Target Allocation Issues
- Appendix C The Sensitivity of Strike Results to Preattack Planning Factors
- Glossary