In response to a request from Congress, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the
Department of Homeland Security sponsored a National Academies study to assess
the safety and security risks of spent nuclear fuel stored in cooling pools and dry
casks at commercial nuclear power plants. The information provided in this book
examines the risks of terrorist attacks using these materials for a radiological dispersal
device. Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel is an unclassified public
summary of a more detailed classified book. The book finds that successful terrorist
attacks on spent fuel pools, though difficult, are possible. A propagating fire in a
pool could release large amounts of radioactive material, but rearranging spent fuel
in the pool during storage and providing emergency water spray systems would
reduce the likelihood of a propagating fire even under severe damage conditions.
The book suggests that additional studies are needed to better understand these
risks. Although dry casks have advantages over cooling pools, pools are necessary at
all operating nuclear power plants to store at least the recently discharged fuel. The
book explains it would be difficult for terrorists to steal enough spent fuel to construct
a significant radiological dispersal device.
- Cover
- Front Matter
- NOTE TO READERS
- SUMMARY FOR CONGRESS
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- CHARGE 4: RISKS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON THESE MATERIALS AND THE RISK ...
- CHARGE 1: POTENTIAL SAFETY AND SECURITY RISKS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORED IN POOLS
- CHARGE 3: POTENTIAL SAFETY AND SECURITY ADVANTAGES, IF ANY, OF DIFFERENT DRY CASK STORAGE DESIGNS
- IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
- 1.1 CONTEXT FOR THIS STUDY
- 1.2 STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THE STUDY CHARGES
- 1.4.1 Nuclear Fuel
- 1.4.2 Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel
- 1.4.3 Spent Fuel Inventories
- 1.4.4 History of Spent Fuel Storage
- 2.1 BACKGROUND ON RISK
- 2.2 TERRORIST ATTACK SCENARIOS
- 2.2.1 Air Attacks
- 2.2.2 Ground Attacks
- 2.2.4 Terrorist Theft of Spent Fuel for Use in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
- 2.3 RISKS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES
- 2.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- 3 SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE
- 3.1 BACKGROUND ON SPENT FUEL POOL STORAGE
- 3.2 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON SAFETY AND SECURITY OF POOL STORAGE
- 3.3 EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF POOL STORAGE
- 3.3.1 Could a Terrorist Attack Lead to a Loss-of-Pool-Coolant Event?
- 3.3.2 What would be the Radioactive Releases if a Pool Were Drained?
- 3.3.3 Discussion
- 3.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- 4 DRY CASK STORAGE AND COMPARATIVE RISKS
- 4.1 BACKGROUND ON DRY CASK STORAGE
- 4.2 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISKS OF DRY CASK STORAGE
- 4.2.1 Large Aircraft Impacts
- 4.2.3 Discussion
- 4.3 POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF DRY STORAGE OVER WET STORAGE
- 4.4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- 5.2 COMMUNICATION ISSUES
- 5.3 FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION
- REFERENCES
- A.2 SECOND MEETING, MARCH 46, 2004, ARGONNE, ILLINOIS
- A.5 FOURTH MEETING, MAY 1012, 2004, WASHINGTON, D.C.
- A.11 NINTH MEETING, NOVEMBER 2930, 2004
- REFERENCES
- B BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
- C.1 GERMAN COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
- C.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE
- C.4 TESTS ON GERMAN CASKS
- REFERENCE
- D.1 DESIGN FOR A CLOSED FUEL CYCLE
- D.2.2 Effect of Reversal of U.S. Fuel Reprocessing Policy
- D.3.1 Pressurized Water Reactors
- D.3.2 Boiling Water Reactors
- D.3.3 Reactor Fuel and Reactor Control
- REFERENCES
- E GLOSSARY
- F ACRONYMS
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