The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 was devastating for the region, but policymakers at least believed that they gained a great deal of knowledge on how to prevent, mitigate, and resolve crises in the future. Fifteen years later, the Asian developing countries escaped the worst effects of the global crisis of 2008–10, in part because they had learned the right lessons from their own experience. In this important study, the Asian Development Bank and Peterson Institute for International Economics join forces to illuminate the contrast between Asia's performance during the more recent crisis with its performance during its own crisis and the gap between what the US and EU leaders recommended to Asia then and what they have practiced on themselves since then. The overriding lessons emerging from the essays in this volume are that countries need to prepare for crises as if they cannot be prevented, make room for stabilization policies and deploy them rapidly when crises hit, and address the need for self-insurance globally if they can, or regionally if they must.
- Cover
- Table of Contents
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- The United States and Europe Can Learn from Japan’s “Lost Decades”
- Central Bank Actions in Advanced Economies during the Global Financial Crisis Had Net Positive Impact
- Asian Countries Fared Better during the Global Financial Crisis than during the Asian Crisis
- The West Failed to Practice What It Preached during the Asian Crisis
- The Role of the International Monetary Fund Is Crucial
- Regional Financial Arrangements and Global Institutions Should Increase Coordination
- Regional Financial Institutions Face the Same Challenges as Global Institutions
- Most of Emerging Asia Is in a Solid Debt Position, but
Japan Faces Challenges
- Chapter 2 Banking Crises and “Japanization”: Origins and Implications
- Japan’s Stagnation Experience
- International Comparative Perspectives of Banking Crisis Experiences
- Econometric Analysis of Banking Crises and Growth
- Conclusion and Policy Implications
- References
- Appendix 2A
- Chapter 3 Responses of Central Banks in Advanced Economies to the Global Financial Crisis
- How Have Central Banks Responded to the Crisis?
- How Effective Were the Responses?
- Conclusions
- References
- Appendix 3A
- Chapter 4 Why Did Asian Countries Fare Better during the Global Financial Crisis than during the Asian Financial Crisis?
- Macroeconomic Performance of Five Asian Countries: TheAsian versus the Global Financial Crisis
- Empirical Framework
- Empirical Results
- Concluding Observations
- References
- Chapter 5 Policy Advice and Actionsduring the Asian and Global Financial Crises
- The Asian Financial Crisis
- The US Financial Crisis
- Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 6 Evolution of the Asian and European Financial Crises: Role of the International Monetary Fund
- Crisis Origins
- Evolution of the Crises in Asia and Europe
- Lasting Lessons?
- References
- Chapter 7 Global and Regional Financial Safety Nets: Lessons from Europe and Asia
- Rise of Regional Arrangements
- Cooperation Challenges and Policy Prescriptions
- Conclusion
- References
- Appendix 7A
- Chapter 8 Regional Responses to Financial Crises: The Americas, East Asia, and Europe
- Europe: The Road to the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact
- Asia: Intergovernmentalism and Limits of the Chiang Mai Initiative
- The Western Hemisphere: American Leadership, Weak Institutions
- Conclusion
- References
- Chapter 9 Sovereign Debt and Asia: International Lessons and Emerging Issues
- The Latin American Crisis in the 1980s
- The East Asian Crisis of the Late 1990s
- The Euro Area Debt Crisis since 2010
- Debt Dynamics
- Debt Sustainability in Asia
- Fiscal Sustainability
- Domestic Bond Markets
- The Japan Problem
- Debt and Growth
- Conclusion
- References
- About the Contributors
- Index
- Other Publications from the Peterson Institute for International Economics
- Back Cover