Dewey's Metaphysics

Dewey's Metaphysics

Form and Being in the Philosophy of John Dewey

This work challenges recent neo-pragmatist interpretations of Dewey as a historicist, radically anti-essential thinker. By tracing Dewey's views on the issues of change and permanence, Boisvert demonstrates the way Dewey was able to learn from important scientific discoveries.
  • Cover
  • DEWEY'S METAPHYSICS
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  • CONTENTS
  • Abbreviations
  • Introduction
    • 1. Preliminary Remarks
    • 2. The Need for Such a Study
    • 3. General Outline
  • I • IDEALISM
    • 1. Change and Permanence in Dewey's Idealistic Period
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Dewey's Idealistic Years
        • 2.1. Dewey's Kantian Phase
          • 2.11. Knowledge as Mediated and Synthetic
          • 2.12. The Transition to Hegelianism
        • 2.2. Dewey’s Hegelian Phase
          • 2.21. The Influence of Trendelenburg
          • 2.22. The Influence of George Sylvester Morris
          • 2.23. Dewey's Writings During His Hegelian Phase
          • 2.24. Dewey on Leibniz
            • 2.241. Relations
            • 2.242. Intelligence
            • 2.243. The Dynamic Interpretation of Existence
            • 2.244. Potentiality, Actuality, and End
      • 3. Summary
  • II • EXPERIMENTALISM
    • 2. Darwin, Change, and the Transition to Experimentalism
      • 1. A Renewed Emphasis on Change
      • 2. Darwin's Impact on the Conception of Form
        • 2.1. Implications of the New View for Traditional Philosophical Problems
        • 2.2. Specific Implications of the New View for the Question of Change and Permanence
      • 3. Dewey: Still a Kantian?
      • 4. Summary
    • 3. Change and Permanence in the Experimental Logic
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Restatement of the Problem
      • 3. Dewey's Criticisms of Alternative Views
        • 3.1. "Objects" in Dewey's Instrumentalism
        • 3.2. Dewey and Realism
        • 3.3. Dewey and Idealism
      • 4. Dewey's Constructive Doctrine
        • 4.1. Thought and Things
        • 4.2. Eidos
      • 5. Summary
  • III • NATURALISM
    • 4. Dewey's Objections to Traditional Doctrines
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Techne and Physis
      • 3. Change, Permanence, and the Need for Philosophy
        • 3.1. Permanence and Social Need
        • 3.2. Art and Forms
        • 3.3. Biology and Language
        • 3.4. Selective Emphasis
      • 4. Dewey and Kant Re-examined
        • 4.1. Takens or Givens?
        • 4.2. Reason and Intelligence
      • 5. Summary
    • 5. Metaphysics and Evolutionary Biology
      • 1. Continuity with the Classical Tradition
      • 2. Evolution and Ontology
        • 2.1. Interaction and the Separation of Matter and Form
        • 2.2. Three Characterizations of Forms
        • 2.3. The Dynamic Interpretation of Beings
      • 3. Categorial Analysis
        • 3.1. Events
        • 3.2. Relations
        • 3.3. Categories Apply to Both Techne and Physis
      • 4. Objective Relativism and Forms
        • 4.1. Forms as Objectively Relative in Techne and Physis
      • 5. Summary
    • 6. Dewey's Reconstruction of Traditional Metaphysics
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Forms and Ends
      • 3. From Techne to Physis in Dewey
      • 4. Dewey's Reformulation of Classical Insights
        • 4.1. Forms as "Eternal"
        • 4.2. Intelligence and Forms
        • 4.3. Forms as Possibilities
        • 4.4. A Pluralistic Theory of Forms
      • 5. Summary
    • 7. Logical Forms
      • 1. Introduction
      • 2. Logic as Methodology
      • 3. Logic and Ontology
      • 4. Logical Forms
      • 5. Summary
    • Conclusion: Some Implications of the Study
      • 1. Dewey and the Foundationalist/Anti-Foundationalist Controversy
      • 2. On Interpreting Dewey
  • Bibliography
  • Indices

Subjects

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