One of the unique aspects of the WTO as an international organization is that it authorizes members to retaliate against violations by raising tariffs. These authorizations have become increasingly common and increasingly controversial. In this analysis of the retaliation system, Robert Lawrence considers the guiding principles that govern responses to WTO violations, examines how these principles are implemented in practice, and considers options for reform.
- Cover
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Flawed System?
- Plan of the Book
- Chapter 2 Role of Remedies in the WTO System
- Preconditions
- The Reciprocity Paradigm
- WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: A Deconstruction
- Agreement and Enforcement: Independent Arrangements
- Conclusion
- Chapter 3 Practice Makes Imperfect
- Perceptions
- Circumstances
- Discretion
- Measurement Problems
- Divergent Opportunity Cost
- Legal Interpretations: The Exception that Proves the Rule
- Chapter 4 Imperfect Practice in the US-EU Trading Relationship
- The Only Game in Town
- Agriculture
- Health Standards
- Steel
- Tax Policy
- Conclusions
- Chapter 5 Options for Change
- Eliminate Rebalancing
- Allow Only Compensatory Liberalization
- Enhance Penalties
- Fines
- Preauthorized Compensation: Contingent Liberalization Commitments
- Chapter 6 Concluding Comments
- Protection
- Compliance
- Sovereignty
- Equity
- Final Observations
- References
- Index