From the 1980s on, a privatization of labor market-related risks has occurred in the OECD. Governments have cut the generosity of social programs and tightened eligibility rules, particularly for the unemployed. Government Ideology, Economic Pressure, and Risk Privatization: How Economic Worldviews Shape Social Policy Choices in Times of Crisis analyses these curtailments for eighteen countries over the course of four decades and provides an encompassing comparative assessment of the interactive impact of government ideology and economic pressure. It demonstrates that the economic worldviews of governments are the most important factor in explaining why cuts are implemented or not. While ideas of non-intervention in the market underlie cuts in generosity, ideas of equality and fairness are at the heart of stricter eligibility criteria. This book also shows that the impact of the economic pressures often held responsible for the marginalization of politics and government ideology is in fact conditional on the specific ideological configuration.
- Cover
- Table of Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1. Risk Privatization, Economic Crisis, and the Primacy of Politics
- 1.1 Context, Research Problem, and Research Question
- 1.2 The Independent Variable Problem
- 1.3 Addressing the Independent Variable Problem in the Study of Partisan Effects
- 1.4 Way of Preceding and Outline of the Results
- 2. Much Ado about Nothing? Retrenchment versus Resilience
- 2.1 What Is Retrenchment? Searching for a Definition
- 2.2 How to Measure Retrenchment?
- 2.3 Developments and Patterns in OECD Countries
- 2.4 When Is Change Significant? Retrenchment and Its Consequences
- 2.5 Conclusion
- 3. Theoretical and Analytical Framework: What We (Do Not) Know
- 3.1 Three Perspectives on Government Ideology and Retrenchment
- 3.2 State of Research: Inconclusive Evidence, Desiderata, and Problems
- 4. Theoretical and Analytical Framework: Taking Ideology Seriously
- 4.1 The “Independent Variable Problem” in Comparative Welfare Research
- 4.2 Addressing the Problem: Ideology as Cognitive Frame/Belief System
- 5. The “End of Ideology?” Government Ideology over Time
- 5.1 The Debate on Ideological Change and Ideological Convergence
- 5.2 Developments and Patterns: Partial Ideological Convergence
- 6. The Ideological Complexion of Government and Retrenchment
- 6.1 Research Design: Case Selection, Data, and Model Specification
- 6.2 Group-Interest Explanations versus the General Framing Argument
- 6.3 Testing Robustness, Alternative and Complementary Explanations
- 6.4 Specific Framing Argument: Ideology Moderates Economic Pressure
- 6.5 Crisis, Ideology, and Retrenchment in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden
- 6.6 Summary Regarding the Hypotheses: Why Ideology Still Matters
- 7. Ideology Still Matters: Findings, Limitations, and Implications
- 7.1 Summary and Findings
- 7.2 Implications for the “Old” versus “New” Politics Debate
- 7.3 The Contribution(s) of the Study
- 7.4 Limitations of the Study and Avenues for Future Research
- 7.5 Implications for Representative Democracy and the Welfare State Debate
- Annex
- Annex 1 Right-Left (RILE) Position of Parties over Time
- Annex 2 Correlation Matrix Left Items of the RILE
- Annex 3 Correlation Matrix Right Items of the RILE
- Annex 4 Right-Left over Time in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Annex 5 Welfare Ideology over Time in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Annex 6 Market Ideology over Time in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Annex 7 Item Description Welfare and Market Ideology
- Annex 8 Effects of Ideology on Generosity and Conditionality in POLS, FE, FE Robust, FEVD
- Annex 9 Union Density over Time in Eighteen OECD Countries
- References
- Index
- List of Figures and Tables
- Figures
- Figure 2.1 – Generosity of Income Replacement (in percent) in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Figure 2.2 – Social Transfer Spending as Share of GDP and Growth Relative to GDP in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Figure 2.3 – Conditionality Ratio (Duration in Weeks/Qualification in Weeks) in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Figure 2.4 – Workfare Reforms/Shifts in Balance between Rights and Obligations in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Figure 3.1 – Potential Determinants of Retrenchment
- Figure 3.2 – Developments in Taxation and Social Contributions, 1965-2010
- Figure 4.1 – Dynamic Left-Right Positions of Governments Labeled as Left, Center, or Right
- Figure 4.2 – UK Conservative Party Positions
- Figure 4.3 – UK Labour Party Positions
- Figure 4.4 – German FDP Positions
- Figure 5.1 – Development of Right-Left, Welfare Ideology, and Market Ideology
- Figure 5.2 – Right-Left Positions of Left/Center/Right Governments over Time
- Figure 5.3 – Welfare Ideology of Left/Center/Right Governments over Time
- Figure 5.4 – Market Ideology of Left/Center/Right Governments over Time
- Figure 6.1 – Basic Model and Hypothesized Effects
- Figure 6.2 – Dotplot, Leverage of Countries: Cabinet Shares and Generosity
- Figure 6.3 – Dotplot, Leverage of Countries: RILE, Welfare, Market, and Generosity
- Figure 6.4 – Dotplot, Leverage of Countries: Cabinet Shares and Conditionality
- Figure 6.5 – Dotplot, Leverage of Countries: RILE, Welfare, Market, and Conditionality
- Figure 6.6 – Opposition Ideology Effects on Generosity
- Figure 6.7 – Opposition Ideology Effects on Conditionality
- Figure 6.8 – Ideological Distance and Generosity
- Figure 6.9 – Ideological Distance and Conditionality
- Figure 6.10 – Interaction RILE × RILE, Generosity
- Figure 6.11 – Interaction RILE × RILE, Conditionality
- Figure 6.12 – Interaction RILE × Welfare, Generosity
- Figure 6.13 – Interaction Market × Welfare, Generosity
- Figure 6.14 – Interaction Market × Market, Generosity
- Figure 6.15 – Interaction Welfare × Welfare, Conditionality
- Figure 6.16 – Effect of Economic Growth on Generosity as a Function of Cabinet Shares
- Figure 6.17 – Effect of Economic Growth on Generosity as a Function of the RILE
- Figure 6.18 – Effect of Economic Growth on Generosity as a Function of Welfare Ideology
- Figure 6.19 Effect of Economic Growth on Generosity as a Function of Market Ideology
- Tables
- Table 2.1 – Generosity and Conditionality of Unemployment Insurance in Eighteen OECD Countries
- Table 3.1 – Quantitative Studies on the Role of Cabinet Ideology for Welfare Retrenchment
- Table 4.1 – Left and Right Items of the RILE
- Table 4.2 – Correlations of the RILE and Selected Socio-economic and Welfare Positions
- Table 4.3 – Factor Analysis, Component Matrix
- Table 4.4 – Welfare Ideology and Market Ideology
- Table 4.5 – Welfare and Market Ideology as Cognitive Frames
- Table 5.1 – Summary Statistics: Government Ideology Pre- versus Post-break
- Table 6.1 – Structure of the Compiled Data Set
- Table 6.2 – Correlation Matrix, Variables of the Baseline Model(s)
- Table 6.3 – Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition, Generosity Change, Models 1-10a
- Table 6.4 – Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition, Generosity via Transfers, Models 1-10b
- Table 6.5 – Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition, Conditionality Change, Models 1-10c
- Table 6.6 – Generosity Dimension in Different Country Groups
- Table 6.7 – Conditionality Dimension in Different Country Groups
- Table 6.8 – Overview: Ideology and Generosity Change in Six Cabinets
Texte
Audio
Adobe DRM
Connectez-vous à votre compte