Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept.
Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.
- Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence
- Copyright
- Preface
- Contents
- Executive Summary
- WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD?
- ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY
- DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES
- Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Policies Involving the Role and Use of Nuclear Weapons
- Applying Deterrence Policy
- Missile Defenses
- SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
- METRICS AND DECISION AIDS
- 1 Deterrence: An Overview
- INTRODUCTION
- THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE
- THE NEW CONTEXT
- ENDURING PRINCIPLES
- The Dynamic Quality of National Interests
- Credibility
- Communications
- Perceptions
- Applicability
- Intelligence
- DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES
- Policies Involving Nuclear Weapons
- Coupling of Nuclear Weapons with Other Forces
- Targeting Policy
- No First Use
- Weapons of Mass Destruction and Precision-Guided Munitions
- Extended Deterrence
- Applying Deterrence Policy
- Self-Deterrence
- Escalation
- Declaratory Policies
- Alliance Implications of Exercising Deterrence Policy
- Unilateral and Multilateral Deterrence
- Alliances and Coalitions
- Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack
- The Strategic Significance of Ballistic Missile Attacks
- Defense in Depth Against Ballistic Missiles
- Active Defense Against Ballistic Missile Attack
- ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING
- 2 IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POLICY: TASKS FOR POLICY MAKERS
- THE NEW DETERRENCE ENVIRONMENT
- CREATING A FABRIC OF DETERRENCE
- SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES
- CONCLUDING REMARKS
- 3 Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
- INTRODUCTION
- OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY
- Objectives of Deterrence
- How to Measure the Chances for Success
- ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE
- Sustain the Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine Force
- Increase the Ratio of Offensive to Defensive Capability
- Sustain the Naval Forces' Forward Presence
- Incorporate Deterrence in the Overall Naval Forces' Planning Process
- DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES, MODELING, AND SIMULATION
- APPENDIX A Revising the Practice of Deterrence
- CHANGING CONTEXT
- STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
- RUSSIAN CASE
- THE SUBORDINATION AND REVISION OF DETERRENCE
- Alert Practices
- The Accounting for and Physical Security of Fissionable Materials
- Restraints on Operational Doctrine
- CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE
- APPENDIX B Contemporary Strategic Deterrence and Precision-Guided Munitions
- WHAT IS DETERRENCE? WHY AND HOW?
- COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
- CURRENT CHALLENGES
- APPENDIX C Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Coalitions for Defending Against Regional Challengers Armed with Weapons of Mass…
- INTRODUCTION
- POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGES TO A VITAL U.S. REGIONAL INTEREST
- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS
- CHANGED ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
- IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UNILATERALLY
- IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THROUGH A COALITION
- INCENTIVES TO JOIN THE COALITION AND SUPPORT ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY
- ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR COALITION INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
- CONCLUSIONS
- APPENDIX D The Remaining Unique Role of Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
- BACKGROUND
- THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
- FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION
- CONCLUSIONS
- APPENDIX E Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Deterrence
- INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE
- Meaning of "Deterrence"
- Deterrence vs. Dissuasion
- NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE
- Nuclear Deterrence
- Deterrence After the Cold War: Are Conventional Forces Enough?
- Conclusion: Nuclear Weapons Remain a Necessary Component of U.S. Deterrence
- DETERRENCE VIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE
- Current U.S. Nuclear Policy
- Future Options for Nuclear Deterrence
- REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
- APPENDIX F Notes on the "Band" Between "Existential Deterrence" and the Actual Use of Force
- APPENDIX G.1 Special Challenges in Extending Deterrence in the New Era
- A PROVOCATIVE PREMISE
- TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DETERRING THREATS TO NON-VITAL INTERESTS
- Factors Contributing to Deterrence
- Possible Suggestions for Weak and Medium-Strength States
- Possible Suggestions for U.S. Security Planning
- POTENTIAL ACTIONS
- APPENDIX G.2 Decision Modeling as an Aid to Strategic Planning and Crisis Action
- ABSTRACT
- INTRODUCTION
- MODELING OPPONENTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS
- Assessment of Options
- Alternative Images of the Opponent
- Identifying the Factors Affecting Judgments and Decisions
- Estimating the Opponent's Judgments and Decisions
- FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK TAKING
- A GENERIC SITUATION ENCOURAGING AGGRESSION
- CONCLUSIONS
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- APPENDIX G.3 Protecting Weak and Medium-Strength States: Issues of Deterrence, Stability, and Decision Making
- ABSTRACT
- INTRODUCTION
- A Central Premise
- Approach
- DETERRENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CENTURY
- Potential Threats
- Useful Distinctions
- Sobering Realities
- More Cheerful Considerations
- AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DETERRENCE
- Observations and Motivations
- Modeling the Decision Making of Adversaries
- Assessment of Options
- Information Needed
- Alternative Images
- Factors and Judgments
- Abstracting from the Decision-Modeling Approach: A Success Tree for Deterrence
- Discussion
- DETERRING STRONG NEIGHBORS: STRATEGIES FOR WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES
- Potential Insights from a Decision-Modeling Perspective
- Minimize Incentives for Invasion or Coercion
- Lay the Groundwork for Favorable Moral and Cultural Considerations
- If Feasible, Maintain a Substantial Defense with Allies
- Use Arms Control to Enhance Military Security and Political Relationships
- Don't See Nuclear Weapons as a Panacea
- EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN DEFENSE OF WEAK OR MEDIUMSTRONG STATES
- Recognize and Express Interests, Including Less-than-vital Interests, Explicitly and Credibly
- Prepare Politically and Militarily for Prompt Intervention Given Strategic Warning
- Beware of "Deterrent Actions" Without Backup
- Enhance the Credibility of Defense with Forward Presence
- Plan to Supplement the Defender's Defenses Quickly and Optimally
- Deter Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Use Arms Control and Other International Mechanisms to Limit Forces and Constrain Force Postures in Ways Promoting Stability
- Develop Theater Missile Defenses
- Seek Alternatives to Current U.N. Mechanisms
- RECOGNIZING THAT IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE MAY FAIL
- Punishment as a Strategic Option
- CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY STRATEGY, DEFENSE PLANNING, AND CRISIS DECISION MAKING
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- APPENDIX H Theater Missile Defense, National IBM Systems, and the Future of Deterrence
- CONTEXT
- BACKGROUND
- THE PROBLEM
- NEAR-TERM OPTIONS FOR U.S. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
- WHAT IS THE THREAT?
- Credibility and Responsibility
- THE BIG PROBLEM FOR CITY DEFENSE
- The Threat to the United States
- REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO THE ABM TREATY
- Revival of the Strategic Defense Initiative?
- A Truly Cooperative Defensive System?
- Brilliant Pebbles Resurgent?
- Instead of Brilliant Pebbles, Brilliant Eyes?
- CONCLUSIONS
- APPENDIX I Deterrence: Clash and Utilization of Value Systems
- INTRODUCTION
- BACKGROUND
- VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT WORLD
- CASE STUDIES
- CONCLUSION
- NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS
- APPENDIX J Controlling Instabilities Caused by Rogue Governments
- THE EMERGING THREAT
- IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THREAT
- A DEFENSE IN DEPTH
- AN APPROACH TO INTERCEPTING BALLISTIC MISSILES AFTER LAUNCH
- SUGGESTED ACTIONS
- APPENDIX K Deterrence-Quo Vadis?
Text
Audio
Adobe DRM
Login to your account